According to an analysis by the American think tank CSIS, increased US scrutiny over Chinese products exported through third countries will not resolve the trade imbalance between Washington and Beijing.
Researcher Hugh Grant-Chapman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), based in Washington, argues that the administration of US President Donald Trump confuses fraudulent customs duty evasion schemes with the legitimate reorganization of international production chains.
He notes that the White House mistakenly equates entirely legitimate business operations with criminal behavior, referencing the Trump administration's August report titled The Great Transshipment Scam.
In this document, the White House accuses China of using more than 40 intermediate economies to bypass US tariffs by redirecting Chinese goods.
In Grant-Chapman's view, the US administration has expanded the concept of re-export, which traditionally implied goods passing through third countries without substantial transformation, to include products actually manufactured in these markets using Chinese components.
The researcher acknowledges documented cases of customs fraud, particularly those related to batteries, steel products, and solar panel components, but insists that these practices only explain part of the indirect presence of Chinese products in the American market.
He emphasizes that re-export itself is not inherently illegal or undesirable from a governmental policy perspective.
The study mentioned by CSIS shows that in 2024, Mexico and Vietnam accounted for 23% and 15% of China's added value, which indirectly flowed into the US, respectively.
Nevertheless, the research concludes that most of these flows are driven by industrial processing rather than simple goods redirection.
A study by the US Federal Reserve estimates that China's production in Mexico contributed to an increase in Mexican exports by approximately 14 percentage points after the imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods in 2018 and 2019, whereas direct re-export was less than one percentage point.
The CSIS analysis also demonstrates that countries such as Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam have not recorded a wide increase in the matching of goods imported from China and exported to the US.
Conversely, Cambodia and Laos show more evident signs of growth in these flows, especially concerning steel products and photovoltaic elements.
For Grant-Chapman, the fundamental problem lies in the structural imbalance of the two largest global economies. In China, high trade surpluses are maintained by low domestic consumption, state support for industry, and an export-oriented growth model.
In the United States, import demand is stimulated by low savings rates, budget deficits, and increased investment, particularly in artificial intelligence infrastructure.
The researcher explains that these macroeconomic foundations place the United States in the position of a net importer, and China as a net exporter.
He recalls that in 2025, Chinese exports grew by 5.5%, despite sales in the US declining by approximately 20%, with some products being redirected to other markets, including the European Union.
CSIS also points out that many intermediate countries currently benefit from US tariffs that are 10–20 percentage points lower than those applied to China, which encourages companies to move production operations to these markets.
Grant-Chapman concludes that a sustainable path requires a more thorough analysis of global trade standards, a reassessment of the impact of US tariff differences on the market, and open dialogue with trade partners and business leaders.
